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BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 This appeal requires us to determine whether personal 
injury causes of action arising from the alleged wrongful 
conduct of a debtor corporation, asserted against a third-party 
non-debtor corporation on a “mere continuation” theory of 
successor liability under state law, are properly characterized 
as “generalized claims” constituting property of the 
bankruptcy estate.  We conclude that they are, and will, 
therefore, affirm the order of the District Court.  
I. 
 In August of 2010, Aaroma Holdings LLC 
(“Aaroma”), f/k/a Duane Street, LLC,  purchased certain 
assets and assumed certain liabilities of Emoral, Inc. 
(“Emoral”), f/k/a Polarome International, Inc., a manufacturer 
of diacetyl, a chemical used in the food flavoring industry.  At 
the time of the transaction, the parties were aware of potential 
claims against Emoral arising from exposure to diacetyl, 
although those individuals who came to be known in this 
litigation as the “Diacetyl Claimants” or the “Diacetyl 
Plaintiffs” (herein, “Diacetyl Plaintiffs”) apparently had never 
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themselves been employed by Emoral.  The Asset Purchase 
Agreement specifically provided that Aaroma was not 
assuming Emoral’s liabilities related to “the Diacetyl 
Litigation,” and that it was not purchasing Emoral’s 
corresponding insurance coverage.  (App. at 326-27.) 
 
 When Emoral filed for bankruptcy protection in June 
of 2011, disputes arose between the bankruptcy trustee (the 
“Trustee”) and Aaroma, including, for example, the Trustee’s 
claim that Emoral’s sale of assets to Aaroma constituted a 
fraudulent transfer.  On September 21, 2011, the Trustee and 
Aaroma entered into a Settlement Agreement (the 
“Agreement”) resolving the claims.  As part of the 
Agreement, Aaroma agreed to pay $500,000 and take certain 
specific actions, and the Trustee agreed to release Aaroma 
from any “causes of action . . . that are property of the 
Debtor’s Estate” as of the date of the Agreement.  (Id. at 
1079-80.)   
 
 At a hearing before the Bankruptcy Court regarding 
approval of the settlement, the Diacetyl Plaintiffs objected to 
the releases contained in the Agreement to the extent that 
those releases might bar them from bringing claims against 
Aaroma, as a successor to Emoral, for personal injuries 
related to diacetyl.  A representative for the Trustee stated its 
view that the Diacetyl Plaintiffs’ successor liability claims 
against Aaroma “do[] not belong to the Estate” and that the 
Trustee, therefore, “can’t release [them].”1  (Id. at 1277.)  
Counsel for Aaroma argued, however, that whether or not the 
Diacetyl Plaintiffs’ causes of action were property of the 
estate (and therefore covered by the release) was not an issue 
before the Bankruptcy Court at that time.  (Id. at 1280-81.)  
Ultimately, the parties added the following language to the 
order approving the settlement to address concerns expressed 
by the Diacetyl Plaintiffs:  “Nothing contained in this Order 
or in the Aaroma Settlement Agreement will operate as a 
                                                 
1 The Trustee’s representative stated:  “I would like to sell 
someone the Brooklyn Bridge, but I don’t own it so I can’t 
sell it.  I cannot, the Trustee cannot release claims that he 
doesn’t own.  It was never contemplated that he would be 
releasing claims he doesn’t own.”  (Id. at 1278.) 
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release of, or a bar to prosecution of any claims held by any 
person which do not constitute Estate’s Released Claims as 
defined in the Aaroma Settlement Agreement.”  (Id. at 1206, 
1355.)  By order of October 7, 2011, the Bankruptcy Court 
approved the settlement.  The ultimate question, however, of 
whether the Diacetyl Plaintiffs’ causes of action constituted 
“Estate’s Released Claims,” as defined in the Agreement, was 
not resolved.   
 
 The Diacetyl Plaintiffs filed individual complaints 
against Aaroma in the Superior Court of New Jersey (see, 
e.g., id. at 1227-45) alleging personal injury and product 
liability claims and asserting that Aaroma was a “mere 
continuation” of Emoral and, therefore, liable.  (Id. at 1233.)  
In April 2012, Aaroma filed in the Bankruptcy Court a 
“Motion to Enforce Court Order Approving Settlement with 
Bankruptcy Trustee and Compelling Dismissal of State Court 
Actions,” arguing that the Diacetyl Plaintiffs’ claims were 
barred by the Agreement’s language as to release.  The 
Diacetyl Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that it was the 
understanding of the parties that their claims were not 
released under the Agreement.  (Id. at 1324-26.)  They cited, 
for example, the statement made on behalf of the Trustee 
during the hearing before the Bankruptcy Court prior to the 
approval of the settlement that their claims “do[] not belong 
to the Estate” and that the Trustee, therefore, “can’t release 
[them].”  (Id.)  In the motion to enforce the order approving 
the settlement, however, the Trustee did not take a position, 
stating that it was an issue of law for the Bankruptcy Court to 
determine.  (Id. at 1341.)   
 
 Following oral argument, the Bankruptcy Court, in a 
lengthy opinion, denied Aaroma’s motion, holding that the 
Diacetyl Plaintiffs’ personal injury causes of action were not 
property of the estate because the Diacetyl Plaintiffs alleged 
“a particular injury not generalized injury suffered by all 
shareholders or creditors of Emoral.”  (Id. at 1387.)  The 
Bankruptcy Court stated that “While successor liability has 
been imposed derivatively, this Court finds that the 
underlying injury that is alleged to be the basis and premise of 
the state court actions is personal harm . . . to the individual 
plaintiffs” and that “Emoral has not suffered any personal 
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harm nor have the creditors as a general whole.”   (Id.)    
 
 Aaroma appealed to the District Court, and the District 
Court reversed, emphasizing that the Diacetyl Plaintiffs had 
no cause of action against Aaroma (which, it was not 
disputed, neither manufactured nor sold diacetyl) except on a 
successor liability theory.  (Id. at 7-8.)  The District Court 
held that the cause of action for successor liability was a 
“generalized” claim belonging to the estate because the facts 
giving rise to the cause of action were not specific to the 
Diacetyl Plaintiffs but common to all creditors, and because, 
if the Diacetyl Plaintiffs were to succeed in establishing that 
Aaroma constituted a “mere continuation” of Emoral, this 
would benefit the creditors of Emoral generally.  (Id. at 7-9.)  
It stated:   
 
[T]he potential liability of Aaroma to the 
Diacetyl Plaintiffs does not arise out of the 
alleged misfeasance of Aaroma as to these 
creditors individually but rather out of its 
alleged continuation of the general business 
operation of the actual alleged wrongdoer, 
Emoral.  Put slightly differently, for purposes of 
determining whether the cause of action belongs 
to the Estate, the critical distinction between the 
personal injury claim against Emoral and the 
successor liability claim against Aaroma is that 
establishing the former would benefit only the 
allegedly injured Diacetyl Plaintiffs whereas 
establishing the latter  -- that Aaroma is the 
“mere continuation” of Emoral and thus should 
be charged with all its liabilities – would benefit 
creditors of Emoral generally. 
 
(Id. at 8-9.)  Accordingly, the District Court reversed and 
remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for entry of an order 
consistent with the District Court’s opinion.  The Diacetyl 
Plaintiffs now appeal, arguing that they have standing to 
assert their personal injury causes of action against Aaroma, 
and that the District Court erred in conflating these claims 
with their successor liability theory.   
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II. 
 We have jurisdiction to review the order of the District 
Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291.  The District 
Court had jurisdiction to review the Bankruptcy Court’s 
decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).  We “exercise the 
same standard of review as the District Court when it 
reviewed the original appeal from the Bankruptcy Court,” 
and, thus, review the Bankruptcy Court’s factual findings 
under a clearly erroneous standard and exercise plenary 
review over legal issues.  In re Rodriguez, 629 F.3d 136, 138 
(3d Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Handel, 570 F.3d 140, 141 (3d 
Cir. 2009)).   
 
III. 
 The basic legal framework applicable to this case is 
not in dispute.  After a company files for bankruptcy, 
“creditors lack standing to assert claims that are ‘property of 
the estate.’”  Bd. of Trustees of Teamsters Local 863 Pension 
Fund v. Foodtown, Inc., 296 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2002).  
The “estate,” as defined in the Bankruptcy Code, includes “all 
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the 
commencement of the case.”  11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).  This 
includes causes of action, which are considered property of 
the bankruptcy estate “if the claim existed at the 
commencement of the filing and the debtor could have 
asserted the claim on his own behalf under state law.”  
Foodtown, 296 F.3d at 169 n.5.  In order for a cause of action 
to be considered “property of the estate,”   
 
the claim must be a “general one, with no 
particularized injury arising from it.”  On the 
other hand, if the claim is specific to the 
creditor, it is a “personal” one and is a legal or 
equitable interest only of the creditor.  A claim 
for an injury is personal to the creditor if other 
creditors generally have no interest in that 
claim. 
 
Id. at 170 (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, 
Inc., 884 F.2d 688, 701 (2d Cir. 1989) and Koch Refining v. 
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Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 831 F.2d 1339, 1348-49 
(7th Cir. 1987)).     
 
 A cause of action that is “property of the estate” is 
properly pursued by the bankruptcy trustee because it inures 
to the benefit of all creditors.  This promotes the orderly 
distribution of assets in bankruptcy, and comports with “the 
fundamental bankruptcy policy of equitable distribution to all 
creditors that should not be undermined by an individual 
creditor’s claim.”  Koch Refining, 831 F.2d at 1344.  As the 
Second Circuit has held, when examining “common claims 
against the debtor’s alter ego or others who have misused the 
debtor’s property in some fashion,” where a claim is “a 
general one, with no particularized injury arising from it, and 
if that claim could be brought by any creditor of the debtor, 
the trustee is the proper person to assert the claim, and the 
creditors are bound by the outcome of the trustee’s action.”  
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 884 F.2d at 701.   
 
 To determine whether the Diacetyl Plaintiffs’ cause of 
action against Aaroma constitutes property of Emoral’s 
bankruptcy estate, we must examine the nature of the cause of 
action itself.  While the Diacetyl Plaintiffs focus on the 
individualized nature of their personal injury claims against 
Emoral, we cannot ignore the fact, and fact it be, that their 
only theory of liability as against Aaroma, a third party that is 
not alleged to have caused any direct injury to the Diacetyl 
Plaintiffs, is that, as a matter of state law, Aaroma constitutes 
a “mere continuation” of Emoral such that it has also 
succeeded to all of Emoral’s liabilities.   
 
 The parties do not dispute that under both New Jersey 
and New York state law,2 an acquiring company is generally 
“not liable for the debts and liabilities of the selling company 
simply because it has succeeded to ownership of the assets of 
the seller,” except in limited circumstances.  Lefever v. K.P. 
Hovnanian Enters., Inc., 160 N.J. 307, 310 (N.J. 1999).  One 
                                                 
2 There is no dispute that either New Jersey or New York law 
applies and that the two states’ relevant applicable legal 
standards are identical, rendering a choice-of-law analysis 
unnecessary.  
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exception to the general rule against successor liability is 
where the purchasing company “is a mere continuation of the 
seller.”  Id.  To establish liability based on a “mere 
continuation” theory, as the Diacetyl Plaintiffs seek to do 
against Aaroma, a plaintiff must “establish that there is 
continuity in management, shareholders, personnel, physical 
location, assets and general business operation between 
selling and purchasing corporations following the asset 
acquisition.”  Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 
342 (N.J. 1981).   
 
 The Diacetyl Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate how any of 
the factual allegations that would establish their cause of 
action based on successor liability are unique to them as 
compared to other creditors of Emoral.  Likewise, they fail to 
demonstrate how recovery on their successor liability cause 
of action would not benefit all creditors of Emoral given that 
Aaroma, as a mere continuation of Emoral, would succeed to 
all of Emoral’s liabilities.  Thus, the Diacetyl Plaintiffs’ cause 
of action against Aaroma is “general” rather than 
“individualized.”  See Foodtown, 296 F.3d at 169-70.   
 
 Although we have not before squarely addressed this 
issue, other courts applying New York and New Jersey law 
have held that state law causes of action for successor 
liability, just as for alter ego and veil-piercing causes of 
action, are properly characterized as property of the 
bankruptcy estate.  In In re Keene Corp., 164 B.R. 844, 849 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), for example, plaintiffs alleged that 
they had claims for asbestos-related injuries against Keene, 
the debtor corporation, and brought various lawsuits against 
certain third-party non-debtor defendants, alleging that Keene 
wrongfully transferred assets to those defendants which 
prevented plaintiffs from collecting damages from Keene.  
164 B.R. at 848.  Invoking successor liability, plaintiffs 
argued that by acquiring the assets of Keene, defendants also 
assumed the asbestos-related liabilities.  The court, applying 
New York law with respect to successor liability, held that 
plaintiffs’ causes of action constituted property of the estate:   
 
[T]he remedy against a successor corporation 
for the tort liability of the predecessor is, like 
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the piercing remedy, an equitable means of 
expanding the assets available to satisfy creditor 
claims.  The class action plaintiffs that invoke it 
allege a general injury, their standing depends 
on their status as creditors of Keene, and their 
success would have the effect of increasing the 
assets available for distribution to all creditors. 
 
Id. at 853.  Accordingly, the court held that the successor 
liability causes of action should be asserted by the trustee on 
behalf of all creditors.   
 
 Likewise, in In re Buildings by Jamie, Inc., 230 
B.R.36, 43 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998), the court, applying New 
Jersey law, concluded that a debtor’s individual creditors 
lacked standing to bring an alter ego veil-piercing cause of 
action seeking recovery from non-debtor third-party 
defendants, because that cause of action constituted property 
of the bankruptcy estate.  It held that because New Jersey law 
permits a corporation to pierce its own veil and because 
recovery on the alter ego claim would benefit the estate as a 
whole,3 the cause of action was “properly characterized as a 
general claim as to which the trustee alone has standing as 
representative of the estate.”  230 B.R. at 44.  The court 
discussed our holding in Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Coopers & 
Lybrand, 22 F.3d 1228, 1240 n.20 (3d Cir. 1994), in which 
we observed that it “may seem strange” to allow a 
corporation to pierce its own veil, “since it cannot claim to be 
either a creditor that was deceived or defrauded by the 
corporate fiction, or an involuntary tort creditor.”  Id.  
However, we recognized that, in New Jersey and in other 
states, “piercing the corporate veil and alter ego actions are 
allowed to prevent unjust or inequitable results; they are not 
based solely on a policy of protecting creditors.”  Id.  Thus, 
because a veil-piercing cause of action is “based upon 
preventing inequity or unfairness, it is not incompatible with 
the purposes of the doctrine[] to allow a debtor corporation to 
                                                 
3 In Buildings by Jamie, there was no question that recovery 
on the alter ego claim “would necessarily inure to the benefit 
of all creditors,” because the plaintiff creditors constituted the 
entire body of creditors.  230 B.R. at 44.   
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pursue a claim based upon such a theory.”  Id.  
 
 As we observed in Phar-Mor, so, too, here it “may 
seem strange” to hold that a cause of action for successor 
liability against Aaroma is property of Emoral’s bankruptcy 
estate.  As a practical matter, it is difficult to imagine a 
factual scenario in which a solvent Emoral, outside of the 
bankruptcy context, would or could bring a claim for 
successor liability against Aaroma.  See Buildings by Jamie, 
230 B.R. at 42 (similarly acknowledging in the veil-piercing 
context that “from a practical standpoint, principals of a 
solvent debtor will not be compelled to pierce the veil of the 
very entity they use as a conduit for their personal business,” 
as this would “effectively extinguish their limited liability and 
expose them to the personal liability that the corporate form is 
employed to avoid”).   
 
 Just as the purpose behind piercing the corporate veil, 
however, the purpose of successor liability is to promote 
equity and avoid unfairness, and it is not incompatible with 
that purpose for a trustee, on behalf of a debtor corporation, to 
pursue that claim.  See Phar-Mor, Inc., 22 F.3d 1240 n.20; see 
also Baker v. Nat’l State Bank, 161 N.J. 220, 227-28 (N.J. 
1999) (discussing successor liability and holding that it 
requires a “fact specific and equitable analysis”); Walensky v. 
Jonathan Royce Int’l, Inc., 264 N.J. Super. 276, 284 (N.J. 
App. Div. 1993) (holding that “the doctrine of successor 
liability exists to protect against [] inequities”).  As in Keene 
Corp. and Buildings by Jamie, the Diacetyl Plaintiffs’ cause 
of action against Aaroma would be based on facts generally 
available to any creditor, and recovery would serve to 
increase the pool of assets available to all creditors.  
Therefore, the District Court appropriately classified that 
cause of action as a generalized claim constituting property of 
the estate.  See also In re OODC, LLC, 321 B.R. 128, 136 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2005) (holding that the bankruptcy trustee 
had standing to pursue successor liability claims because the 
claims were general and common to all creditors, noting that 
“most other courts have found that the trustee in bankruptcy 
has standing to bring successor liability (or alter ego) suits on 
behalf of all creditors”).   
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 The Diacetyl Plaintiffs concede that there is no 
relevant caselaw directly supporting their position that 
individual personal injury claims asserted on a successor 
liability theory should not be considered property of the 
bankruptcy estate.   They attempt to distinguish Keene Corp. 
and related caselaw, however, by drawing a distinction 
between, on one hand, a successor liability claim as a primary 
cause of action, and, on the other hand, successor liability as 
an equitable remedy to satisfy an individual damage claim.  
We are not aware of any applicable legal authority drawing 
such a distinction and, indeed, we note that any cause of 
action asserting successor liability necessarily contemplates 
some underlying damage or liability for which the claimant is 
seeking recourse from a third party.  
 
 The Diacetyl Plaintiffs also argue that Foodtown 
supports their position because we held in that case that a 
pension fund’s claim against third party affiliates of a debtor 
employer did not constitute property of the debtor’s 
bankruptcy estate.  See 296 F.3d at 170.  Their reliance on 
Foodtown is misplaced.  In Foodtown, a plaintiff pension 
fund sought to recover $9.3 million in ERISA withdrawal 
liability owed by the debtor to the pension fund by bringing 
an alter ego veil-piercing claim and claims for breach of 
fiduciary duty against third parties.  The cause of action at 
issue, however, did not constitute a general claim for 
successor liability based on a mere continuation theory, but 
instead a specific claim for liability pursuant to ERISA.  We 
observed in Foodtown that “[w]ith regard to alter ego liability 
in cases involving claims to pension benefits protected by 
ERISA . . . there is a federal interest supporting disregard of 
the corporate form to impose liability.”  Id. at 169 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  Moreover, crucial to 
our holding in Foodtown was the fact that the cause of action 
did not arise until after the debtor’s bankruptcy filing, and 
thus could not be considered property of the estate.  We 
distinguished the cause of action in Buildings by Jamie, 
which “was based on a general injury suffered by a corporate 
debtor prior to its bankruptcy filing” from the cause of action 
in Foodtown, which “ar[ose] from a statutorily imposed 
withdrawal liability that occurred after the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition.”  Id. at 171.  The Diacetyl Plaintiffs’ 
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cause of action is distinguishable from the claim in Foodtown 
for the same reason.   
 
IV. 
 Because the Diacetyl Plaintiffs’ cause of action for 
successor liability against Aaroma belongs to the bankruptcy 
estate, it falls within the “Estate’s Released Claims” within 
the meaning of the Agreement between the Trustee and 
Aaroma.  The District Court, therefore, properly reversed the 
Bankruptcy Court’s denial of Aaroma’s motion to enforce the 
order approving the settlement, and we will affirm the order 
of the District Court.  We recognize that, in so doing, we 
leave the Diacetyl Plaintiffs, who allege that they have 
suffered serious personal injuries resulting from exposure to a 
harmful chemical, albeit not at the hands of Aaroma, with no 
apparent recourse against Aaroma.  We note, however, that 
our holding has no bearing on any remedy the Diacetyl 
Plaintiffs may be seeking directly against Emoral in the 
bankruptcy proceeding or against any of the numerous other 
defendants the Diacetyl Plaintiffs have named in the actions 
pending in the Superior Court of New Jersey.    
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting 
 I agree with the Bankruptcy Court that the Diacetyl 
Plaintiffs’ claims against Aaroma constitute “individualized 
claims” belonging to the Diacetyl Plaintiffs themselves.  
Because the majority instead concludes that such claims are 
“generalized claims” belonging to the bankruptcy estate, I 
must respectfully dissent. 
 
 It is undisputed that “creditors lack standing to assert 
claims that are ‘property of the estate.’”  Bd. of Trs. of 
Teamsters Local 863 Pension Fund v. Foodtown, Inc., 296 
F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2002).  A cause of action or claim, in 
order to be considered property of the estate, “must be a 
‘general one, with no particularized injury arising from it.”  
Id. at 170 (quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. 
PepsiCo, Inc., 884 F.2d 688, 701 (2d Cir. 1989)).  “[W]here a 
claim ‘is a general one, with no particularized injury arising 
from it, and if that claim could be brought by any creditor of 
the debtor, the trustee is the proper person to assert the claim, 
and the creditors are bound by the outcome of the trustee’s 
action.’”  (Majority Opinion at 8 (quoting St. Paul, 884 F.2d 
at 701); see also id. at 7-8 (quoting Foodtown, 296 F.3d at 
170).)  “On the other hand, if the claim is specific to the 
creditor, it is a ‘personal’ one and is a legal or equitable 
interest only of the creditor.”  Id. 
 
 Because the Diacetyl Plaintiffs’ claims against Aaroma 
“could [not] be brought by any creditor of the debtor,” they 
constitute individualized claims belonging to the Diacetyl 
Plaintiffs themselves—and not to the debtor or the 
bankruptcy estate.  Initially, it is uncontested that the 
underlying personal injury claims against Emoral are 
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individualized in nature.  In fact, personal injury and product 
liability causes of action under state law represent 
quintessential examples of an individualized claim, i.e., “a 
‘personal’ [claim that is] a legal or equitable interest only of 
the creditor.”  Id.  The majority insists that “we cannot ignore 
the fact . . . that [the Diacetyl Plaintiffs’] only theory of 
liability as against Aaroma, a third party that is not alleged to 
have caused any direct injury to the Diacetyl Plaintiffs, is 
that, as a matter of state law, Aaroma constitutes a ‘mere 
continuation’ of Emoral such that it has also succeeded to all 
of Emoral’s liabilities.”  (Id. at 8-9 (emphasis omitted).)   
Nevertheless, the Court also cannot ignore the claims or 
allegations underlying this theory or remedy of successor 
liability.  As the Bankruptcy Court explained in its thorough 
and well-reasoned ruling, “the underlying injury that is 
alleged to be the basis and premise of the state court actions is 
personal harm by exposure to Diacetyl by the individual 
plaintiffs or harm to the individual plaintiffs.”  (A1387.)  The 
successor liability theory alleged by the Diacetyl Plaintiffs is 
inextricably tied to—and cannot be considered separate or 
apart from—their underlying personal injury and product 
liability allegations.  Because the Diacetyl Plaintiffs’ 
underlying allegations are clearly individualized in nature, 
their claims against Aaroma—which seek to hold this third 
party liable for their alleged injuries as the “mere 
continuation” of Emoral—must also be considered as 
individualized claims.  In short, “any creditor of the debtor” 
could not allege that the third party should be held 
responsible on this specific theory of successor liability for 
injuries allegedly suffered as a result of exposure to a product 
 
3 
made and sold by the debtor itself.  For instance, a trade 
creditor of the debtor could not make such a claim. 
 
 I believe that the prior case law, beginning with our 
own ruling in Foodtown, weighs in favor of this approach to 
the Diacetyl Plaintiffs’ claims. 
 
  “In Foodtown, a plaintiff pension fund sought to 
recover $9.3 million in ERISA withdrawal liability owed by 
the debtor [Twin] to the pension fund by bringing an alter ego 
veil-piercing claim and claims for breach of fiduciary duty 
against third parties.”  (Majority Opinion at 13.)  This Court 
determined that “Twin’s withdrawal liability is not property 
of the estate” because “the claim did not arise until after the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition.”  Foodtown, 296 F.3d at 170 
(footnote omitted).  We, however, did not stop there.  On the 
contrary, we went on to conclude that “[t]he claim for 
withdrawal liability is also not a legal or equitable interest of 
the debtor.”  Id.; cf., e.g., Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass’n—
Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n Pension Fund v. Comm’r of 
Internal Revenue, 523 F.3d 140, 147 n.5 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We 
note that this portion of the opinion is an alternative holding, 
not a dictum:  ‘Where a decision rests on two or more 
grounds, none can be relegated to the category of obiter 
dictum.’”  (quoting Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 
535, 537 (1949))).  In doing so, the Foodtown Court 
specifically focused on the creditor’s underlying withdrawal 
liability allegations, referring, for example, to “Twin’s 
withdrawal liability” and “Appellees’ evasion of withdrawal 
liability.”  Foodtown, 296 F.3d at 170.  The alleged evasion 
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of liability, in turn, did not injure either Twin or the creditors 
in general: 
 
 In this case, the injury is not insolvency 
stemming from Appellees’ actions.  Here, the 
injury is the Appellees’ evasion of withdrawal 
liability.  Withdrawal liability is not owed to 
Twin; rather, it is owed to the pension fund.  
Because the liability is owed only to the fund, 
the claim is personal to the Appellant.  
Moreover, absent a general creditors’ interest, a 
trustee can only collect money that may be 
owing to the bankrupt entity.  Here, there is no 
general creditors’ interest in the statutorily 
imposed withdrawal liability owed to the fund.  
Rather, the action to recover the withdrawal 
liability has the character of an action for 
damages flowing from an alleged illegality 
against the fund.  The alleged illegality may 
have caused other injuries in addition to those 
caused to the fund, but the direct injury to the 
fund—the evasion of its statutory entitlement—
defines the nature of plaintiff’s claim as a 
personal one. . . . 
   
Id. (citing Steinberg v. Buczynski, 40 F.3d 890, 892 (7th Cir. 
1994); Apostolou v. Fisher, 188 B.R. 958, 968 (N.D. Ill. 
1995)).  In fact, we did not specifically address the elements 
of the pension fund’s alter ego and veil piercing causes of 
action until we considered the claims on their merits, after 
concluding that this creditor had standing to pursue such 
 
5 
claims in the first place.  See id. at 167-73.  Likewise, even 
though our opinion in Foodtown referred to a federal interest 
in disregarding the corporate form in ERISA and MPPAA 
cases, id. at 169, we actually applied New Jersey law to 
conclude that the creditor stated claims for alter ego liability 
and for piercing the corporate veil, id. at 171-73. 
 
 We thereby adopted in Foodtown an expansive 
approach to the question of whether a creditor’s cause of 
action against a third party constitutes an individualized claim 
and, at the very least, exhibited a preference for allowing a 
third party claim to be decided on the merits.  As a practical 
matter, I do not see how the same court that was willing to 
permit the pension fund’s third party claims to go forward 
could reach the opposite result with respect to the Diacetyl 
Plaintiffs’ own third party claims against Aaroma.  Just as we 
relied on the individualized nature of the underlying 
withdrawal liability allegations to permit a creditor to pursue 
its claims against several third parties, we likewise should 
allow the Diacetyl Plaintiffs’ claims against Aaroma to go 
forward given the individualized nature of their own 
underlying personal injury and product liability allegations. 
 
 The Court in Foodtown turned for support to the 
Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Steinberg, which addressed what 
we called “a similar case.”  Id. at 171.  The Steinberg court 
determined that a bankruptcy trustee lacked standing to 
pursue an adversary proceeding against the debtor’s 
shareholders “seeking to pierce the corporate veil and hold 
them personally liable for the corporation’s debt to the 
pension fund,” where the pension fund had already obtained a 
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monetary judgment against the debtor corporation prior to 
bankruptcy.  Steinberg, 40 F.3d at 891.  Like Foodtown, the 
Seventh Circuit’s opinion distinguished between the claims of 
the debtor corporation and the claims belonging to its creditor 
pension fund: 
 
The point is simply that the trustee is confined 
to enforcing entitlements of the corporation.  He 
has no right to enforce entitlements of a 
creditor.  He represents the unsecured creditors 
of the corporation; and in that sense when he is 
suing on behalf of the corporation he is really 
suing on behalf of the creditors of the 
corporation.  But there is a difference between a 
creditor’s interest in the claims of the 
corporation against a third party, which are 
enforced by the trustee, and the creditor’s own 
direct—not derivative—claim against the third 
party, which only the creditor himself can 
enforce. . . . 
 
Id. at 893.  A trustee has standing to pursue an action to 
pierce the corporate veil on behalf of the bankrupt corporation 
only if the corporation was injured by the shareholders’ 
disregard of corporate formalities.  Id. at 892; see also, e.g., 
Foodtown, 296 F.3d at 170-71 (citing Steinberg).  I do not see 
how Aaroma’s alleged “mere continuation” of Emoral could 
have harmed Emoral itself.  To paraphrase Foodtown, “the 
injury [alleged by the Diacetyl Plaintiffs] is not insolvency 
stemming from [Aaroma’s] actions.”  Foodtown, 296 F.3d at 
170.          
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 The Second Circuit recently considered the question of 
standing in In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities 
LLC, 721 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 2013), petition for cert. filed, 82 
U.S.L.W. 3264 (U.S. Oct. 9, 2013).  A trustee appointed 
under the Securities Investor Protection Act sought to bring 
claims on behalf of the victims of a multi-billion-dollar Ponzi 
scheme against several financial institutions for their alleged 
role in this fraudulent scheme.  Madoff, 721 F.3d at 57-58.  
The trustee focused on “a passage in St. Paul—stating that a 
trustee may bring a claim if the ‘claim is a general one, with 
no particularized injury arising from it, and if that claim could 
be brought by any creditor of the debtor’”—and asserted that 
“the third-party claims here are common to all customers 
because all customers were similarly injured by Madoff’s 
fraud and the Defendants’ facilitation.”  Id. at 70 (quoting St. 
Paul, 884 F.2d at 701).  The Second Circuit nevertheless 
determined that the trustee’s theory “is flawed on many 
levels.” Id.  Relying, inter alia, on the Seventh Circuit’s 
reasoning in Steinberg, the Madoff court thereby rejected the 
trustee’s “broad reading” of St. Paul.  Id. at 70-71.  “As 
illustrated by St. Paul, when a creditor seeks relief against 
third parties that pushed the debtor into bankruptcy, the 
creditor is asserting a derivative claim that arises from harm 
done to the estate” and that accordingly belongs to the 
bankruptcy estate.  Id. at 70.  In addition, the Madoff trustee 
“seeks to assert claims on behalf of thousands of customers 
against third-party financial institutions for their handling of 
individual investments made on various dates in varying 
amounts,” id. at 71.  Because these alleged wrongful acts 
could not have harmed all of the customers in the same way, 
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the claims could not be considered to be “common” or 
“general” in nature.1  Id.        
                                                 
 1 The majority turns for support to two 
bankruptcy court decisions that “have held that state law 
causes of action for successor liability, just as alter ego and 
veil-piercing causes of action, are properly characterized as 
property of the bankruptcy estate.”  (Majority Opinion at 10.)  
However, I believe that both opinions—which clearly are not 
binding on this Court—are distinguishable on a number of 
different grounds.  Unlike our ruling in Foodtown, neither 
Buildings by Jamie nor Keene really looked to the underlying 
injury or injuries alleged by the creditors.  In turn, Buildings 
by Jamie did not involve either personal injury or product 
liability claims.  The Foodtown Court distinguished this New 
Jersey bankruptcy case because, among other things, “the 
trustee [in Buildings by Jamie] had standing to pursue an 
alter ego action on behalf of the corporate debtor to recover 
on a defaulted loan.”  Foodtown, 296 F.3d at 171.  
“Furthermore, the In re Buildings by Jamie court held, 
consistent with our decision here, that under New Jersey law 
an alter ego action is an equitable remedy that may only be 
asserted by a corporation when it suffers harm.”  Id.  As the 
majority acknowledges, the plaintiff creditors actually 
constituted the entire creditor body in this New Jersey 
bankruptcy proceeding.  Buildings by Jamie, 230 B.R. at 44.  
I also note that “the plaintiffs’ counsel conceded that the 
creditors’ claims belonged to the bankruptcy estate and 
acknowledged, therefore, that the creditors would not be 
named as co-plaintiffs with the trustee in the adversary 
complaint.”  Id. (citation omitted).  For its part, the New York 
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 The majority admits that “we leave the Diacetyl 
Plaintiffs, who allege that they have suffered serious personal 
injuries resulting from exposure to a harmful chemical, albeit 
not at the hands of Aaroma, with no apparent recourse against 
Aaroma.”  (Id. at 14.)  I do not believe that either federal 
bankruptcy law or state law mandates such a drastic and harsh 
result.  After all, the plaintiffs in this case are not trade 
creditors seeking to recover from the successor a specific 
amount of money owed by the debtor; they are men and 
women allegedly suffering from severe lung problems caused 
by exposure to a chemical made and sold by the debtor.  Their 
state law claims accordingly implicate important state 
                                                                                                             
bankruptcy court in Keene construed the creditors’ 
complaints as invoking the “fourth exception” for successor 
liability, i.e., “‘the transfer of assets is for the fraudulent 
purpose of escaping liability.’”  Keene, 164 B.R. at 852-53 
(citations omitted); see also, e.g., RDM  Holdings, Ltd. v. 
Cont’l Plastics Co., 762 N.W.2d 529, 707 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2008) (“Con-Plastics’ role as an alleged successor is tied 
solely to plaintiffs’ allegations concerning the fraudulent 
transfer of assets; however, we find that this aspect of the 
successor liability claim was subsumed under the UFTA 
[Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] claim, which was properly 
dismissed on the basis of res judicata. . . . For the same 
reasons, we will not permit plaintiffs to pursue any fraudulent 
transfer allegations against Con-Coatings under the guise of a 
successor liability claim.”).  In any event, I find Keene’s 
reasoning with respect to successor liability and other third 
party theories to be at odds with the more liberal approach set 
forth by this Court in Foodtown.     
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interests, such as providing adequate compensation to 
individuals seriously injured by defective products.  Cf., e.g., 
Foodtown, 296 F.3d at 169 (“With regard to alter ego liability 
in cases involving claims to pension benefits protected by 
ERISA, as amended by the MPPAA, there is ‘a federal 
interest supporting disregard of the corporate form to impose 
liability.’” (quoting Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 933 
F.2d 449, 460-61 (7th Cir. 1991))).  The Diacetyl Plaintiffs 
additionally have not obtained any judgment against Emoral 
(or Aaroma) for a specified amount, and their claims 
accordingly have not been denominated.  I further note that 
the Bankruptcy Court granted the Diacetyl Plaintiffs relief 
from the automatic stay to permit them “to litigate their 
products liability action against [Emoral] to judgment and to 
seek recovery from applicable insurance policies insuring the 
Debtor for their alleged injuries.”  (12/11/12 Order at 2.)  The 
Bankruptcy Court, in turn, ordered that their recovery against 
Emoral “shall be limited to the extent of the insurance 
coverage provided to the Debtor and shall be paid from such 
insurance, if at all, and not from any other assets of the 
Debtor’s estate.” 2  (Id. at 2-3.)  Given the circumstances, it is 
not surprising that a representative of the Trustee stated, at the 
                                                 
 2 I agree with the majority that its holding has 
no bearing on any remedy the Diacetyl Plaintiffs may have 
against Emoral the bankruptcy proceeding or against any of 
the other defendants named in the state court proceedings.  
Specifically, it appears the Diacetyl Plaintiffs’ insurance 
proceed claims are currently pending before the New Jersey 
Superior Court, and our ruling today has no effect whatsoever 
on such claims.   
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hearing held by the Bankruptcy Court to decide whether to 
approve the Trustee’s $500,000 settlement with Aaroma, that 
the Diacetyl Plaintiffs’ successor liability claim against 
Aaroma “does not belong to the Estate” and that the Trustee 
accordingly “can’t release it.”  (A1277.) 
 
 Because the claims against Aaroma belong to the 
Diacetyl Plaintiffs, the Bankruptcy Court properly determined 
that “the Diacetyl plaintiffs’ right to assert those claims [was] 
not affected by the settlement agreement [or] the settlement 
approval order” (A1388).  See, e.g., id. at 175 (“Because 
Appellant’s cause of action is based on withdrawal liability 
under ERISA and is not considered property of the estate, 
Twin’s release does not affect Appellant’s claims.”).  For the 
foregoing reasons, I would vacate the District Court’s order, 
which reversed the order of the Bankruptcy Court denying 
Aaroma’s motion to enforce the settlement approval order 
and to compel dismissal of the Diacetyl Plaintiffs’ state court 
actions against Aaroma, and would remand for further 
proceedings. 
